In their recent paper, Nagarajan and Sošić (2009) study an assembly supply chain in which n suppliers sell complementary components to a downstream assembler, who faces a pricesensitive deterministic demand. Suppliers may form alliances, and each alliance then sells a kit of components to the assembler and determines the price for that kit. The assembler buys the components (kits) from the alliances and sets the selling price of the product. Nagarajan and Sošić consider three modes of competition -Supplier Stackelberg, Vertical Nash, and Assembler Stackelberg models -which correspond to different power structures in the market, and study stable supplier alliances when the assembler faces linear and isoelastic demand.
Introduction
In their recent paper, Nagarajan and Sošić (N&S) (2009) study an assembly supply chain in which n suppliers sell complementary components to a downstream assembler, who faces a price-sensitive deterministic demand. They assume that suppliers can form alliances among themselves. While there can be many reasons for the formation of supplier alliances, including tactical operational reasons (e.g., cost savings through shared resources and economies of scale, risk pooling, or improved capacity utilization) and strategic reasons (e.g., increased bargaining power), N&S consider a very simple assembly model, in which many of the reasons for coalition formation among suppliers mentioned above are not present. They assume that the assembler faces deterministic price-sensitive downstream demand with linear costs, and that suppliers sell complementary components, which excludes advantages stemming from risk pooling and cost savings due to economies of scale. In addition, they consider a simple contract in which each supplier (or a coalition of suppliers) charges a per unit wholesale price to the assembler. Supplier alliances similar to the ones described here can be observed in real-life assembly systems. For instance, Greene (2002) discusses several examples of alliances between component manufacturers in the semiconductor industry (e.g., SMIC, a chip manufacturing company, and IMEC, a research company, formed an alliance selling to Texas Instruments). Stallkamp (2001) N&S analyze alliance formation among suppliers using a two stage approach. Suppliers first form alliances that each agree to sell a kit of components to the assembler. Afterwards, alliances make wholesale price decisions, while the assembler buys the components (kits) from the alliances and sets the selling price of the product. In the second stage, N&S consider three modes of competition -Supplier Stackelberg, Vertical Nash, and Assembler Stackelberg models -which correspond to different power structures in the market. In the Supplier Stackelberg game (SS), the suppliers are Stackelberg leaders. Each supplier (or supplier alliance) simultaneously determines a wholesale price w i , and the assembler then sets the retail price of the product. This case represents the market with several powerful suppliers selling to relatively smaller assemblers. In the Vertical Nash (VN) game, the suppliers and the assembler move simultaneously. VN games are usually used to model situations where all players are small or medium-sized. Finally, in the Assembler Stackelberg (AS) game, the assembler determines her margin, and each supplier (or supplier alliance) then determines his wholesale price. This case assumes that the assembler has larger influence on the market than the suppliers and endows her with the first-mover advantage.
In the first stage, N&S analyze the farsighted stability of coalition structures (each alliance considers the possibility that once it acts, another set of suppliers may react, and a third set of suppliers might in turn react, and so on). The main results from their paper are the following: when the assembler faces linear demand, the grand coalition is the most likely stable outcome in Stackelberg models, while the split into two equal-sized coalitions is most likely to be stable under the VN model. When the assembler faces isoelastic demand, the grand coalition and the outcome in which a single supplier acts independently are stable regardless of the model of competition.
An important assumption in the N&S model is that the assembler faces deterministic demand; in this paper, we relax this assumption. Our main goal is to analyze whether the stability results from N&S change if demand contains a stochastic component. Following the lead from Petruzzi and Dada (1999) , for the isoelastic demand case we model randomness in a multiplicative fashion, while for the linear demand we model the stochastic component in an additive way. As mentioned in their paper, this is a common modeling assumption that assumes that the shape of the demand curve is deterministic, while the scaling parameter representing the size of market is random. While many of the papers that analyze assembly models assume deterministic demand, Jiang (2008) and Jiang and Wang (2010) allow for a stochastic demand component. Jiang (2008) analyzes the impact of price postponement in a decentralized assembly system with multiplicative demand under SS competition model. Our model, on the other hand, analyzes alliance stability under different modes of competition and forms of demand, with different postponement scenarios (price, quantity, price and quantity). Jiang and Wang (2010) analyze a decentralized assembly system with multiplicative demand under SS competition model, and study the impact of revenue-sharing contractual mechanisms on channel performance. We concentrate only on the wholesale price mechanism, but analyze alliance stability under three different modes of competition, and study additive demand model along with the multiplicative one. In another related paper, Yin (2010) analyzes alliance formation in assembly systems. Her assembly model is similar to that of Jiang (2008) and Jiang and Wang (2010) ; that is, the paper considers deterministic demand and multiplicative stochastic demand under SS competition model. In addition, in the model with stochastic demand all decisions are made before the actual demand is known. In her analysis of alliance stability, Yin uses the Nash stable set, in which only one-step defections are considered and which assumes that only a single supplier can deviate in any given moment; we, on the other hand, allow for arbitrary group of suppliers to make a move, and each supplier considers how the others may react to his action. Because of this difference, stability results obtained in Yin (2010) differ from those derived in our paper. For instance, while Yin (2010) concludes that in a decentralized assembly system with multiplicative isoelastic demand under SS competition the grand coalition is never stable with four or more suppliers, our results show that if farsighted suppliers can freely form coalitions when contemplating their defections, the grand coalition is always stable.
We start our analysis by considering the models with isoelastic demand, which possess some nice properties that enable more elegant analysis, and then turn our attention to the linear demand models. Similarly to Jiang and Wang (2010) and Yin (2010) , we first conduct the analysis under the assumption that both the assembler and the suppliers make their decisions before observing the actual demand. However, we later extend these results by analyzing scenarios in which some decisions in Stackelberg models are made only after the uncertainty is resolved.
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. Suppose first that all decisions are made before demand realizations and demand is isoelastic. Then, our analysis indicates that the stability of the grand coalition, which was shown in the model with deterministic demand, extends to this setting under every model of competition. However, if the assembler acts as a Stackelberg leader or both parties act simultaneously (VN model), the lone supplier may be worse off than if he belonged to the grand coalition, while the opposite was true in the deterministic case.
This result may be useful, for instance, if the product design changes, and this change requires the addition of a new component supplied by a new supplier. If this newcomer to the market considers whether to join the existing supplier alliance or not, in the presence of uncertainty he is better off by joining the others, and this outcome is likely to be stable (that is, to survive possible threats of defection). When the assembler faces linear demand, the stability of the grand coalition for Stackelberg models is preserved if some additional reasonable conditions hold (see §4 for details).
However, when both sides move simultaneously (in the VN model) and the total market size exhibits significant uncertainty, the stable outcomes are likely to change when compared to those obtained in the deterministic model (the grand coalition and asymmetric two-member coalition structures replace the split into two equal-sized coalitions as stable structures). In other words, instead of seeing a division into two equal-sized pools of supplier, under this scenario we are likely to see one large alliance in the market. Consequently, in the presence of uncertainty a newcomer to the market is better of by joining the smaller alliance (in which he receives a larger share of profit) or acting alone, and this outcome is likely to be stable.
Next, we consider various settings in which some decisions may be postponed until after the true demand is observed. Our analysis indicates that stable outcomes correspond to those obtained in the deterministic case whenever the assembler determines her ordering quantity after the actual demand is realized. Thus, uncertainty has no impact on stability of different outcomes when the ordering decision can be postponed. The same is true if the assembler postpones her pricing decision and either the demand is isoelastic, or demand is linear and uncertainty level is not too high. As it is not possible to obtain closed-form expressions for the model with linear demand and price postponement with higher uncertainty levels, equilibrium decisions and alliance stability need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Our numerical results, however, indicate that stability results from deterministic case are likely to carry over.
As mentioned in N&S, the structure of assembly systems has several important practical implications. On the assembler's side, the ability to predict the number of suppliers that she deals with and the structure of alliances that they form (and, consequently, the kits that they sell) can influence her profit and can have an impact on the design and variety of the final product. On the other hand, the ability to predict stable outcomes can help a supplier to decide whom to align with and to evaluate the long-term stability of his decision. The managers benefit from learning how stability results are related to the elasticity of the demand, the curvature of demand, the uncertainty of demand, and the timing of different decisions.
Our results are also important from a theoretical viewpoint. Recall that we show that the results from deterministic case carry over to the case with uncertainty in many instances; this discovery may be helpful in simplifying future research efforts. Most current models of assembly systems assume that all suppliers provide complementary products and neither of them faces competitionthus, each supplier is equally important and they all earn exactly the same profit margin in an equilibrium. Some of the emerging research in this area (see, e.g., Jiang and Wang 2010, Nagarajan and Sošić 2010) is relaxing this assumption and allowing one or more of the components to have commodity-like characteristics. This, clearly, leads to more complex models, in which randomness further complicates the analysis. Our findings indicate that there are many scenarios in which it might be enough to limit the analysis to deterministic models, as the results carry over to the models with random components.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §2 and §3 we briefly introduce the results from N&S and obtain the expressions for suppliers' profits under random demand when the deterministic component of demand is isoelastic and linear, respectively. In §4 we introduce stability concepts that we use in our analysis and identify stable outcomes for the two demand models. §5 extends our analysis by looking at several scenarios in which some decisions are made only after the uncertainty is resolved. We conclude in §6.
Isoelastic Demand -Multiplicative Case
We start by reviewing results from N&S for suppliers' profits in the isoelastic deterministic demand case. Suppose that an assembler, who faces market demand, makes a product consisting of n components, each provided by a different supplier. Assume that demand is isoelastic, given by D(p) = ap −b , where a > 0 (to ensure nonnegativity of demand) and b > 0 (to reflect price elasticity). Suppose that there is no downstream cost of assembling the components. Each supplier faces a certain manufacturing cost, c i , and sells the component to the assembler at cost w i . To ensure the uniqueness of profit-maximizing solutions, we limit our attention to the case b > n (for VN model, b > n + 1). If we let W = n i=1 w i , the assembler generates a profit
while the profit of a supplier, i, can then be written as
As mentioned earlier, we assume that suppliers can form alliances. We assume that each coalition sells a kit of products (one from each member) and sets a wholesale price for that kit. As shown in N&S, the net profit obtained by each coalition is the same, independent of its membership.
As a result, we assume that coalition members divide the profit equally.
We denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of all players (suppliers). A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition, and the set N of all players is referred to as the grand coalition. Any partition of N ,
corresponds to a coalition structure. We let |Z k | denote the size of the coalition Z k . We will also use Z n k,n−k to denote a coalition structure with two alliances, one containing k players, and the other with n − k players.
Let Π Z i denote the profit obtained by player i in coalition structure Z. Thus, Π N i denotes the profit of any player when the grand coalition is formed. We denote the cost incurred by coalition Z k by c Z k = j∈Z k c j , equilibrium price charged by coalition Z k by w Z k , and the corresponding equilibrium price charged by the assembler by p Z . Clearly, some of these notations are incomplete as the prices set and profit realized by a player depend on both the coalition structure and his individual membership. However, these notations will be made clear depending on the context. N&S show that every coalition at equilibrium charges the same markup. Consider an arbitrary coalition, Z k ∈ Z, and a supplier, i ∈ Z k . If we let C = n 1 c i , then Table 1 gives equilibrium prices and quantities for an arbitrary coalition, Z k , and equilibrium profit for its member, i ∈ Z k . Equil.
SS
VN AS Table 1 : Equilibrium prices and profits in coalition structure Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z l } with deterministic isoelastic demand Now, suppose that demand has a stochastic component, and that the assembler and the suppliers make their decisions before the uncertainty is resolved. As it is common in most of the operations literature (see, e.g., Petruzzi and Dada 1999 , Wang et al. 2004 , Granot and Yin 2008 , Jiang and Wang 2010 , Yin 2010 , in the case with isoelastic demand we assume that the stochastic component is multiplicative (Karlin and Carr 1962) , given by
ε is a random variable defined on [A, B] (A > 0 to assure positive demand), with the cumulative distribution function F (·) and density function f (·). Thus, this model assumes that the market size is random (aε), while the shape of demand curve is deterministic. For consistency, we assume
Following an approach similar to that in Petruzzi and Dada (1999) , we introduce stocking factor z = Q/(ap −b ), and denote
The expected profit for the assembler facing wholesale price W can then be expressed as
The first-order conditions for the assembler's problem are given by
Notice that z does not depend on the number of suppliers/coalitions in the model; it depends only on demand distribution and elasticity of demand. Theorem 2 in Petruzzi and Dada (1999) 
then Petruzzi and Dada (1999) require that
while Wang et al. (2004) show that it is enough that demand distribution satisfies Increasing
Generalized Failure Rate (IGFR),
Note that many commonly used distributions, such as uniform or normal, satisfy these properties.
The profit of a supplier, i, can be written as
Let us denote
.
We can now rewrite (1a) as p(W ) = bW b−1 γ. The following relationships will be useful later in our analysis.
Proof: The first statement follows immediately after observing that z −Λ(z) = 1− B z (u−z)f (u)du and that the integral is nonnegative. The second statement holds because A > 0 and z > A imply 0 ≤ Λ(z) ≤ z.
Supplier Stackelberg (SS) model
We start with the case wherein the suppliers act as Stackelberg leaders. (1) gives the assembler's first-order conditions given (w 1 , ...w n ). Using the reaction function (1a), the suppliers' equilibrium wholesale prices can be derived from the first-order conditions of their profit maximization problems,
and each supplier at equilibrium sets a wholesale price w SS i that satisfies
Therefore, the equilibrium prices are equivalent to the ones obtained in Wang et al. (2004) ,
Vertical Nash (VN) model
Next, we consider the case wherein all players act simultaneously. We assume that each supplier takes as a given the final retail price and the assembler's margin, which we denote by m. Thus,
The first-order conditions for a supplier, i, are given by
Each supplier at equilibrium sets a wholesale price w V N i that satisfies
hence
The assembler conditions her margin on the total wholesale price, W . As a result, her first-order conditions correspond to (1a), and the equilibrium prices are
Assembler Stackelberg (AS) model
Finally, we assume that the assembler first determines her margin, m, and the suppliers then determine their prices. Thus, the reaction function for the suppliers is given by (4), and expression (5) holds for W . The assembler is maximizing her profit function, given bỹ
and the equilibrium prices are
Coalition analysis
We now let suppliers freely form coalitions among themselves. We assume that each coalition sells a kit of products (one from each member) and sets a wholesale price for that kit. Thus, if there are l supplier coalitions, the assembler faces a vector (w 1 , ...w l ) and consequently sets the retail price p M (w 1 , ...w l ) of the product. Using an analysis similar to that in N&S and expressions for suppliers' profits in deterministic case (see Table 1 ), we can obtain equilibrium prices and profits for the stochastic demand case (see Table 2 ).
Equil. SS VN AS It is interesting to notice that when suppliers act as Stackelberg leaders, they set the same price as in the case with no demand uncertainty. This happens because, as shown by (3), the wholesale price charged by the suppliers when they are Stackelberg leaders (in the SS model) does not depend on the assembler's selling price (only on their competitors' prices), which is not true for the remaining two models. In the VN and AS models, the prices/margins are either set simultaneously, or the assembler determines her margin first. Consequently, the price charged by suppliers depends on the assembler's selling price. When faced with uncertainty, the assembler increases her margin, hence both the suppliers and the assembler charge a higher price in an equilibrium after the random demand component is introduced. Moreover, in the presence of uncertainty condition b ≥ n in the AS model (b ≥ n + 1 in the VN model) has to be replaced by b ≥ nγ ( b ≥ nγ + 1 in the VN model).
Additive Demand Case
We next review results from N&S for the linear deterministic demand case: demand is now a simple linear function, given by D(p) = a − bp. To avoid possibility that demand is negative for all feasible prices, we assume that there is a positive demand for the product when it is sold at cost,
while the profit of a supplier, i, can be written as Table 3 : Equilibrium prices and profits in coalition structure Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z l } with linear deterministic demand Now, suppose that demand has a stochastic component, and that the assembler and the suppliers make their decisions before the uncertainty is resolved. As it is common in most of the operations literature (see, e.g., Petruzzi and Dada 1999 , Van Mieghem and Dada 1999 , Wang et al. 2004 , in the case with linear demand we assume that the stochastic component is additive (Mills, 1959) , given by
ε is a random variable defined on [A, B] (A > −a to assure possibility of positive demand). Once again, the market size is random (a + ε), and the demand shape is deterministic. For consistency,
Following an approach similar to that from Petruzzi and Dada (1999) , we introduce the stocking factor z = Q − a + bp. The expected profit for the assembler when the total wholesale price charged by the suppliers is W can be expressed as
Partial derivatives of the assembler's expected profit are given by
For a given W , Theorem 1 in Petruzzi and Dada (1999) provides conditions under which there is a unique pair (z A (W ), p A (W )) (we use superscript A to denote the additive case) which satisfies the first-order conditions for the assembler's problem. Namely, if the demand failure rate satisfies (2) and a − bW
We note that in this case, unlike in the multiplicative model, the value of the stocking factor z depends on the number of suppliers/coalitions (through the value of the wholesale price). This fact complicates the stability analysis of different outcomes.
For a model of competition Υ ∈ {SS, V N, AS}, let z Υ l denote the optimal stocking factor in a coalition structure with l alliances. Using an analysis similar to that in the previous section, we can obtain equilibrium prices and profits (see Table 4 ). We also have the following result.
Equil. SS VN AS
Proposition 2 In assembly models with additive demand and
. Consider the SS model, wherein W can be evaluated from Table 4 as
hence we must have F (z SS l ) ≤ 0.5. A similar calculation can be done for the remaining two models.
We note that whenever z Υ l +Λ(z Υ l ) ≤ 0, the suppliers' wholesale prices decrease when uncertainty is introduced, and (because z Υ l − Λ(z Υ l ) ≤ 0) the assembler's retail price also decreases as a result. Our numerical analysis shows that z Υ l +Λ(z Υ l ) ≤ 0 holds in most of the cases. In addition, even when z Υ l + Λ(z Υ l ) > 0, which results in an increase of the wholesale prices, our numerical experiments showed a decrease in the retail price.
Coalition Stability
When market participants form alliances, important questions of interest are: "Are these alliances likely to be stable?", and "What criteria should be used to evaluate this stability?" Most solution concepts used for analyzing stability of coalition structures (e.g., core (Gillies, 1959) , coalition structure core (Aumann and Dreze, 1974) , strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) ) are static and thus preclude the possibility that once the players deviate, there may be subsequent deviations.
Consider, for instance, the expressions for suppliers' profit in different coalition structures under the SS model with linear demand, described in Table 3 . Although the grand coalition is Pareto efficient, it is easy to verify that any individual supplier would increase his payoff if he defects from the grand coalition. This would immediately imply instability of the grand coalition under static stability concepts. However, this does not imply that the outcome with a single (n − 1)-supplier alliance, Z n 1,n−1 , is stable. Why should we, then, conclude that the move from the grand coalition will happen? It can further be verified that any individual supplier would increase his payoff if he defects from the (n − 1)-supplier alliance. Static analysis does not check if an initial defection may trigger a sequence of further defections. If this sequence eventually leads to an outcome in which the defecting parties are worse off than in the initial outcome, farsighted players may not choose to defect in the first place, and an outcome which initially seemed unstable may actually prove to be stable. A static concept does not take such trade-offs into account.
To study alliance stability, N&S use the notion of the largest consistent set, introduced by Chwe (1994) , and the equilibrium process of coalition formation, introduced by Konishi and Ray (2003) .
Unlike the myopic solution concepts (e.g., the core), these farsighted stability concepts consider possible sequences of defection when deciding on stability of a particular outcome.
The largest consistent set
Roughly speaking, the largest consistent set (LCS) contains all outcomes (coalition structures) such that for each of these outcomes all possible defections by all possible coalitions are deterred, as they may eventually lead to another outcome in the LCS in which the players who made the initial move might be worse off.
More formally, let us denote by ≺ i the players' strong preference relations, described as follows:
for two coalition structures, Z 1 and
Denote by S 0 the following relation: Z 1 S 0 Z 2 if the coalition structure Z 2 is obtained when S 0 deviates from the coalition structure Z 1 .
We say that Z 1 is directly dominated by Z 2 , denoted by Z 1 < Z 2 , if there exists an S 0 such that
A set Y is called consistent if the following holds: Z ∈ Y if and only if for all S 0 and all V such that Z S 0 V there is a B ∈ Y , where V = B or V B, such that Z ≺ S 0 B. Because every coalition considers the possibility that, once it reacts, another coalition may react, and then yet another, and so on, the LCS incorporates farsighted coalitional stability. For a more detailed analysis of farsighted coalitional stability, see Chwe (1994) .
It is interesting to notice that the analysis of the LCS assumes that players receive their payoffs only when the final outcome is reached. Thus, we can think of the sequences of moves considered in the analysis as having the players contemplate possible sequences of defections before deciding which course of action to actually take.
The equilibrium process of coalition formation
While Chwe establishes the existence of the LCS, a possible drawback of this solution concept is that it may be too inclusive. Konishi and Ray (2003) propose an alternate dynamic approach to stability of coalition structures, which they call the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF). This concept is, in its nature, very different from the LCS -it assumes that the players receive their payoffs after every move, and looks at the infinite horizon expected discounted payoffs that the players may receive under different probabilistic paths (processes of coalition formation).
For each player, recall that u Z i denotes player i's payoff in the coalition structure Z, and let δ i denote her discount factor for future payoffs. Then, i's payoff from a sequence of coalition structures {Z t } may be written as
A PCF ψ induces a value function ν i for each player i, which represents the infinite horizon payoff to a player starting from any coalition structure Z under the Markov process ψ, and is the unique solution to the equation
We say that S has a profitable move from Z under ψ if there is V ∈ F S (Z), V = Z, such that
We say that S has a strictly profitable move from Z under ψ if there
A move V is called efficient for S if there is no other move W for S such that ν i (W, ψ) > ν i (V, ψ) ∀i ∈ S. Now, we can define EPCF, as follows: a PCF is an equilibrium PCF if:
1. whenever ψ(Z, V) > 0 for some V = Z, then there is an S such that V is a profitable and efficient move for S from Z, 2. if there is a strictly profitable move from Z, then ψ(Z, Z) = 0 and there is a strictly profitable and efficient move V with ψ(Z, V) > 0.
If ψ(Z, V) ∈ {0, 1} ∀Z, V, a PCF is called deterministic. A coalition structure Z is said to be absorbing if ψ(Z, Z) = 1, while a PCF is absorbing if, ∀V ∈ Z, there is some absorbing coalition structure Z such that ψ (k) (Z, V) > 0, where ψ (k) denotes the k-step transition probability. Konishi and Ray (2003) show that the set of all absorbing states, under all deterministic absorbing EPCFs, is a subset of the LCS. Thus, absorbing states may provide a refinement of the LCS. For a more detailed analysis of EPCFs, see Konishi and Ray (2003) .
Stable outcomes
N&S first identify stable outcome that belong to the LCS, and then use the EPCF with high degrees of foresight and characterize the absorbing states. Thus, all of the stable outcomes identified in N&S (2009) satisfy two different criteria of stability-they belong to the LCS, and they are absorbing states of an EPCF-which is an indicator of their robustness.
The LCS is, by its nature, very inclusive and may admit some outcomes that are less likely to occur in practice. For instance, in the deterministic case with linear demand under the SS competition, the LCS contains the split into two equal-sized coalitions, although this outcome is Pareto dominated by the grand coalition. However, the EPCF refinement allows us to rule out this outcome as less likely to be stable when the suppliers are farsighted.
We take the above discussion into consideration when performing our analysis. We use the more restrictive concept, the EPCF, and first verify if the outcomes that were stable in the deterministic case remain stable in the presence of uncertainty. If this is not the case, we use EPCF to identify some alternative stable coalition structures. Recall, as stated above, that these outcomes also belong to the LCS.
Multiplicative demand case
We first compare suppliers' payoffs in the deterministic and in the stochastic model for the multiplicative demand case. In the deterministic case, N&S show that the grand coalition is Pareto efficient and farsighted stable under every mode of competition. In addition, the outcomes with one independent supplier, Z n 1,n−1 , become stable when the number of suppliers is large enough. Let us first consider the SS model (which is studied in Wang et al., 2004) . As the profit for each supplier differs from his profit in the deterministic model only by a multiplicative constant (zγ −b ), the ordering of suppliers' preferences for different outcomes remains unchanged, and we have stability results equivalent to those obtained in the deterministic case. This leads to our first result.
Proposition 3 In the SS model with isoelastic demand, the stability results do not change after the introduction of the stochastic component. That is, the grand coalition is always stable, and Z n 1,n−1 becomes stable for n ≥ 4.
We next analyze the remaining two models. Note that
where α = b − 1 for the VN model, and α = b for the AS model. We note that
where the inequality follows from Proposition 1, hence the profit of a supplier decreases when demand becomes random. Observe that
Since γ ≥ 1, the decrease in the profit of supplier i increases with the number of coalitions. Thus, the grand coalition remains Pareto efficient when we introduce uncertainty in the model, and it is easy to show (by using the same steps as in N&S) that it remains farsighted stable. However, as the coalition profit decreases with l, it may happen that the lone supplier in Z n 1,n−1 receives less than he would obtain in the grand coalition. When this happens, a joint defection of all suppliers from Z n 1,n−1 to the grand coalition cannot be deterred, and Z n 1,n−1 is not stable. This analysis is summarized in our next result. Thus, when we add randomness to the isoelastic model, the alliance of all suppliers remains stable. Moreover, when suppliers act as Stackelberg leaders, the outcomes with one lone supplier are stable. However, there may be instances in which such outcomes cease to be stable in the remaining two modes of competition.
Additive demand model
We next consider the model in which the random component is additive. If we compare the profit of a supplier, i, in the deterministic and in the stochastic model, we obtaiñ
Unlike in the multiplicative demand case, the value of z Υ l in the additive case depends on the number of coalitions, hence we lose some nice properties that helped us to obtain the equivalence results in the multiplicative demand model. However, several of the results obtained in the deterministic demand case carry over when we impose some additional conditions.
Recall that N&S show that the grand coalition is Pareto efficient in Stackelberg models with deterministic linear demand, and that it is the most likely stable outcome under this type of competition. For the VN model 1 , N&S show that a split into two coalitions, Z n k,n−k , is Pareto efficient under deterministic linear demand, and that an outcome with two equally-sized coalitions,
, is the most likely stable outcome for this type of competition 2 . We next provide conditions under which these results carry over to the model with random demand.
Theorem 2 Consider the additive demand model, and suppose that z Υ l +Λ(z Υ l ), Υ ∈ {SS, V N, AS}, is decreasing in the number of coalitions, l.
1. The grand coalition is a stable outcome for Stackelberg models.
2. In the VN model, (a) When n = 5 or n = 7, the grand coalition is the only stable outcome.
(b) Suppose that n = 4, n = 6, or n ≥ 8.
• If
then outcomes with two equal-sized coalitions, Z n n 2 , n 2 , are stable.
• If (7) does not hold, the grand coalition is stable. In addition, there may exist stable coalition structures of type Z n k,n−k , k = n − k.
While the complexity of underlying equations prohibits us from obtaining closed-form expressions for z Υ l +Λ(z Υ l ), our numerical analysis suggests that this term is decreasing for some commonly used demand distributions, such as uniform or normal. Figure 1 illustrates values of z Υ l + Λ(z Υ l ) for different values of l under the assumption that D(p) = 100 − p for SS and VN competition modes, and with two different distributions for the random demand component: uniform distribution on [-5,5] , and normal distribution with µ = 0, σ = 5.
Proof:
The proof for the Stackelberg models uses the fact that when z Υ l + Λ(z Υ l ) is decreasing in the number of coalitions, the grand coalition remains Pareto efficient: if z Υ l + Λ(z Υ l ) > 0, the increase in the profit of supplier i decreases with the number of coalitions; if z Υ l + Λ(z Υ l ) < 0, the decrease in the profit of supplier i increases with the number of coalitions. Thus, it is easy to show (by using the same steps as in N&S) that the grand coalition remains farsighted stable.
We next consider the VN model. When n = 5 or n = 7 and z V N l + Λ(z V N l ) is decreasing in l, the suppliers' payoffs decrease the least in the grand coalition, and we can show its stability by using the same steps as in N&S.
2 N&S show that the grand coalition is stable under deterministic demand whenever n = 5 or n = 7, while splits into two or three equal-sized coalitions are stable when n = 4, n = 6, or n ≥ 8. When n is odd, we assume that split into two "equal-sized" coalitions implies that one coalition has n 2 members, while the other contains n 2 members. Suppose that n = 4, n = 6, or n ≥ 8. When (7) is satisfied and
remains Pareto-efficient, and it is easy to verify that this outcome remains stable by following the same steps as in N&S. When (7) is not stable when (7) is not satisfied. On the other hand, it is easy to show that the grand coalition becomes stable when (7) does not hold. Consider an arbitrary coalition structure, Z, other than the grand coalition. Then, it follows from the efficiency of the grand coalition that every supplier belonging to the largest coalition in Z receives less than in the grand coalition. Thus, to show that a deviation from the grand coalition to any outcome Z is deterred, we can consider successive defections starting from Z in which one supplier belonging to the largest coalition in the current status quo defects, until the outcome with no alliances is reached. At this point, each supplier receives less than in the grand coalition, and they all benefit from a joint move to the grand coalition.
Thus, as the grand coalition is Pareto efficient, a symmetric split into two coalitions cannot be stable. However, suppose that a lone player in Z n 1,n−1 receives more than in the grand coalition. Then, a possible defection from Z n 1,n−1 to the grand coalition is easily deterred. In addition, because
) is decreasing in l (the number of coalitions), suppose that each supplier in the largest coalition of any arbitrary coalition structure with strictly more than two coalitions (l > 2) receives less than a supplier in the non-trivial coalition of Z n 1,n−1 . As the smallest possible size of the largest coalition in a structure with l coalitions is n l , this will be true if
for all 3 ≤ l ≤ n. As the left-hand side of the inequality decreases in l, the condition is equivalent
When this happens 3 , it can be shown, similarly as above (in the case of the grand coalition), that Z n 1,n−1 is stable. Scenarios of this type can occur for other Z n k,n−k , k > 1, k < n − k.
Thus, when both parties make their decisions simultaneously, the stable outcomes can change when a stochastic demand component is introduced. Inequality (7) implies that each member of the grand coalition makes less than a member of one of the two equal-sized coalitions. This inequality is always satisfied when demand is deterministic, that is, when z l = Λ(z l ) = 0. It is easy to evaluate that (7) is more likely to hold when a is large relative to the variance of ε, which mimics the case with deterministic demand. Once the size of the total market is more random (that is, the variance of ε increases), the suppliers may be better off if they form a single alliance instead of splitting into two equal-sized coalitions. When the uncertainty in market size increases, it is likely that both the ordering quantity and suppliers' margin decrease, and this change depends on the coalition size. Thus, the decrease in deterministic profit stemming from the move from two equal-sized coalition to an all-inclusive coalition may be offset by the increase in profit due to the change in z l . Consequently, when (7) does not hold, the profit that a supplier generates when a single coalition is formed dominates his profit in one of two equal-sized coalitions, and the grand coalition becomes stable. Note that there can be other stable outcomes as well. In particular, although each member in Z n n 2 , n 2 receives less than a member of the grand coalition, a member of 3 For instance, the above inequality always holds for n = 4.
s smaller coalition in Z n k,n−k may receive more than a member of the grand coalition, and Z n k,n−k may be stable as well. In summary, when there is little randomness in the market size, suppliers are likely to group into two coalitions of equal size, while increased uncertainty makes it more likely that we will observe one large coalition, with possibly one smaller one. This information can be helpful, for instance, to a newcomer to the market (say, when product design changes and another supplier is added to the pool) who may contemplate weather to join the grand coalition or not, as it shows that he can act on his own without inducing a sequence of changes in coalition structures.
Extensions -Different Timing of Players' Decisions (Postponement models)
We now modify our assumptions about timing of the events, and assume that the Stackelberg leaders make their decisions (or part of their decisions) before demand realization, while the followers make their decisions (or part of their decisions) after observing the actual demand. The timing of pricing and/or quantity decisions have been studied extensively in operations literature, and we mention here just some of the relevant work. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) was one of the first papers that studied the impact of postponement; they compared different postponement strategies in a two-member supply chain under the additive demand, and thus allowed that either price, or quantity, or both price and quantity can be determined after demand uncertainty is resolved. Granot and Yin (2008) consider the impact of postponement in a two-member supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, and analyze different postponement strategiesthe retailer can determine either her retail price or her order quantity after the uncertainty is resolved. They assume that the manufacturer acts as Stackelberg leader (corresponding to our SS model) and consider multiplicative model of uncertainty with three possible formats for the deterministic demand part-linear, exponential, and negative polynomial (which corresponds to our isoelastic demand with a = 1). Jiang (2008) considers an assembly system that corresponds to our SS system with multiplicative demand, and compares the model in which the assembler determines her price before the demand is known with the one in which the price is determined after demand realization. As can be seen from the above referenced papers, both pricing and/or order decisions can be made after true demand is revealed. However, while the current literature analyzes benefits that different supply chain members can achieve if postponement is implemented, the goal of our analysis is to determine whether postponement has any impact on stability of coalition structures.
We first analyze the SS model in which the suppliers select their prices before the demand is known, while the assembler determines her price and order quantity after uncertainty is resolved.
We also consider a modification of this model, in which all prices are determined before demand is known, while the order quantity is finalized after observing the actual demand. We then analyze the AS model in which the assembler determines her margin before the demand is known, while her ordering quantity and the suppliers' prices are determined after uncertainty is resolved. This type of models may be applicable in settings with high end-demand uncertainty and short lead times, in which the assembler wants to wait until she learns more about the actual market size before committing to her final order quantity. As mentioned earlier, the SS model is applicable in the market with several powerful suppliers selling to relatively smaller assemblers. The market is controlled by suppliers, who play the role of Stackelberg leaders and determine their price early, by taking the assemblers reaction function into consideration. The assembler waits until the uncertainty is resolved before making her final decisions. On the other hand, the AS model assumes that the assembler has larger influence on the market than the suppliers and endows her with the first-mover advantage. She determines her margin early by using the suppliers reaction functions, while the suppliers condition their decision on the final retail price and make their decision after observing the actual demand.
As mentioned above, there may exist instances in which the assembler postpones her price decision until the true demand is known, while both supplier price and the assembler order quantity are determined prior to demand realization. This may be more appropriate in models with longer lead times, in which the orders have to be made early, and the assembler then uses price to influence demand. Thus, we also discuss SS model in which only the retail price is determined after all uncertainty is resolved.
We note that there is another theoretical ordering of events, in which the assembler determines her margin and ordering quantity before observing the demand, while the suppliers determine their prices after they see the actual demand. While this sequencing is not very plausible, we mention it here for the sake of completeness. Note that in this setting the suppliers cannot utilize the information about the actual demand realization, because their decisions are based on the assembler's margin and her ordering quantity. Therefore, the results in this case correspond to the results obtained in the stochastic model in which both parties make their decisions before demand realizations.
We again consider separately the multiplicative and the additive demand model.
Multiplicative demand model
We first assume that the assembler faces stochastic demand of the multiplicative form, and consider different timings of players' decisions mentioned above.
Supplier Stackelberg model
In this subsection, we assume that the suppliers decide their prices before the demand is known, and consider different possible timings for the assembler's decisions.
Price and quantity postponement. After the suppliers determine their prices, the assembler observes the realization of the random variable ε, sayε, and faces the profit function
Thus, the assembler's price is determined by solving the first-order conditions given by
and she orders
The suppliers select the wholesale prices that maximize their expected profits,
where we use the assumption E[ε] = 1. Consequently, both the suppliers and the assembler make pricing decisions equivalent to the ones made in the deterministic model in which the demand is given by the expected demand of the stochastic case,
For a given demand realization,ε, their profits are given byΠ SS A =εΠ SS A ,Π SS i =εΠ SS i . Because the profits differ from the ones obtained in the deterministic model by the same multiplicative constant for every coalition structure, the ordering of suppliers' preferences for different outcomes does not change and the stable supplier coalitions correspond to those obtained in the deterministic case.
Quantity postponement. Consider now a modification of the above model, in which the assembler determines her selling price before the uncertainty is resolved, while the order quantity is decided after the actual demand is observed. It is easy to verify that all of the above results carry over-the assembler's price is now determined as the solution of the equation
and it has the same expression as the solution of equation (8). Thus, all the equilibrium decisions remain unchanged, which corresponds to the result obtain in Granot and Yin (2008) .
We also note the following consequence of quantity (or price and quantity) postponement.
Consider the basic model, in which al decisions are made before observing the true demand (no postponement). It is easy to verify that the assembler in this setting is always better off being the leader (AS model) than being the follower (SS model). However, if the postponement opportunity for the assembler is introduced in the SS model, there are instances in which high demand realization
(b−1)(b−lγ) γ) makes the assembler better off being the follower than being the Stackelberg leader in the setting in which the decisions are made before demand realization.
Price postponement. Finally, suppose that the assembler determines her order quantity before the demand is known, and selects the selling price after the uncertainty is resolved. Following an analysis similar to that in Jiang (2008) and Granot and Jin (2008) , we can show that the wholesale price decisions do not change, and we can express the profit for a supplier, i, aš
By comparing this expression with the expression for his profit without uncertainty (see Table 1 ),
. Thus, similarly as above, we can conclude that the addition of uncertainty in the model in which the assembler's pricing decision is postponed does not change the stability results.
Assembler Stackelberg model
Suppose now that the assembler determines her margin before the demand is known, while her ordering quantity and the suppliers prices are selected after the uncertainty is resolved. After the assembler determines her margin and the uncertainty is resolved, she observesε and orders
while supplier i faces the profit function
and selects w i = c i + p/b. Consequently, the expected profit faced by the assembler is given by
where we use the assumption E[ε] = 1. Both the suppliers and the assembler make pricing decisions equivalent to the ones made in the deterministic model in which the demand is given by the expected demand of the stochastic case,
For a given demand realization,ε, their profits are given byΠ AS A =εΠ AS A ,Π AS i =εΠ AS i . Because the profits differ from the ones obtained in the deterministic model by the same multiplicative constant for every coalition structure, the ordering of suppliers' preferences for different outcomes does not change and the stable supplier coalitions correspond to those obtained in the deterministic case.
Comparisons
We summarize the preceding analysis in the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the assembler faces stochastic demand of the multiplicative form, and some of the pricing and/or ordering decisions may be postponed. Then, regardless of the mode of competition (supplier or assembler act as Stackelberg leader) and the decision being postponed (price, quantity, or price and quantity), stable outcomes correspond to the ones obtained in the model with deterministic demand.
First, consider the SS model, and note that suppliers always make their decision before the uncertainty is resolved. When the ordering quantity can be determined after the actual demand is known, both the assembler's revenue and her cost depend on the actual demand, and the problem collapses to the one with no uncertainty under our assumptions that the expected value of the random component is one. When the ordering quantity has to be determined before demand realization (that is, only the assembler's pricing decision is postponed), the assembler's revenue depends on demand realization, but her cost does not. Thus, when she considers the expected value of her profit function while determining the optimal retail price, she has to look at the expected value of the revenue and the actual value of her cost. However, the only impact on suppliers' profit comes through a multiplicative factor that does not depend on the number of suppliers/coalitions, hence all the stability results carry over. Now, if the assembler acts as a Stackelberg leader and determines her ordering quantity after observing the actual demand, the assembler's price is the only decision made before the uncertainty is resolved, and because E[ε] = 1 she selects the same price as in the case with no uncertainty. Thus, all of the results carry over again.
Additive demand model
We now assume that the assembler faces stochastic demand of the additive form, and consider different timings of players' decisions discussed above.
Supplier Stackelberg model
We first assume that the suppliers select their prices before the demand is known.
Thus, the assembler's price is determined by solving the first-order conditions given by a − 2bp + bW +ε = 0, and she orders
where we use the assumption E[ε] = 0. Consequently,
If we assume that the suppliers will not regroup and form different coalitions for every demand realization, which seems reasonable for long-term industry relationships, we should concentrate on the expected values of their profits. Because E[ε] = 0, the expected profit generated by supplier i corresponds to the profit generated in the deterministic model in which the demand is given by the expected demand of the stochastic case, E[Π SS i ] = Π SS i . Therefore, the stable supplier coalitions correspond to those obtained in the deterministic case.
Quantity postponement. Similarly to our analysis for the multiplicative model, we also consider the case in which only the order quantity is determined after uncertainty is resolved. Although the selling price now corresponds to the solution of a − 2bp + bW = 0, and thus differs from the price set if the pricing decision is made after the uncertainty is resolved by an additive constant (ε/2), it is easy to verify that the expected ordering quantity and the wholesale price do not differ from those obtained when all of the assembler's decisions are postponed, and so the stability results obtained for the case when both p and Q are postponed carry over.
Price postponement. Finally, suppose that only the assembler's pricing decision is made after the uncertainty is resolved. In this case, the solution is not as straightforward as in the previous models that we have analyzed-we cannot obtain closed-form expressions for order quantities, prices, and profit for arbitrary distributions of the random demand component. To see this, note that the assembler's profit function is now given by
that is, her revenue depends on demand realization, while her cost does not. The price she chooses after observing the actual demand is
, ifε ≥ 2Q − a, and her expected profit can then be written as
The assembler has to determine her order quantity before the uncertainty is resolved. We can see that this problems does not have a closed-form solution in a general case. Thus, we cannot make general predictions about coalition stability in the additive demand model if the random component follows arbitrary demand distribution and only the assembler's pricing decision is postponed.
Note that it follows from (9) that, when
then the expression for the assembler's profit collapses to
which is maximized if she selects
Each supplier's profit is then given byΠ
and it is easily shown that it is maximized when he chooses
This further implies that, in an equilibrium, the assembler chooses
hence (10) corresponds to
As the left-hand side of (11) is increasing in l, (11) will hold for all l if (a + bC)/2 > −A. By comparing the above expressions for equilibrium decisions and profits with the ones given in Table 3 , we can conclude that uncertainty has no impact on suppliers' profits when prices are postponed and (a+bC)/2 > −A (that is, when uncertainty level is not too high), and the assembler in expectation receives the same amount as if there is no uncertainty. Note that when l increases the left-hand side of (11) approaches a, and by our assumption we know a > −A. Thus, even when (a + bC)/2 ≤ −A, there is usually a λ such that (11) holds when l > λ, and the expressions for suppliers' profits for those ls are identical to those in the deterministic case (see, for instance, Figure 2 , where n = 20 and deterministic and stochastic suppliers' profits coincide for l ≥ 4, despite high uncertainty level in which a = 100 and B = −A = 80).
When the level of uncertainty increases, the assembler can use pricing to increase her profit in the scenarios with low demand and leave some of the inventory unsold. Consequently, she might be more likely to increase her order quantity so that she could satisfy potentially high demand levels, which benefits the suppliers. As (11) is more likely to hold when the number of alliances is larger, this behavior (increase in order quantity) is more likely to be seen when fewer alliances are formed. In particular, if it occurs for any coalition structure, it will occur for the grand coalition.
As illustrated in Figure 2 , under uniform distribution of the random demand component this increase in total supplier profit is decreasing in l, hence the grand coalition remains the Paretodominant outcome. We believe that the same is true for other distributions. In addition, under uniform distribution we were not able to construct instances under which the sole supplier in Z n 1,n−1 receives less than a supplier in the grand coalition, which would make Z n 1,n−1 unstable. Thus, in the SS model with price postponement the grand coalition is likely to remain Pareto efficient, and it appears that stability results from deterministic case remain preserved.
Assembler Stackelberg model
Suppose now that the assembler determines her margin before the demand is known, while her ordering quantity and the suppliers prices are selected after uncertainty is resolved. After the assembler determines her margin and the uncertainty is resolved, she observesε and orders Similarly to our analysis of the SS model, we again concentrate on the expected profits of supply chain members, and calculate the expected profit of supplier i as
Thus, regardless of the coalition structure, the expected supplier's profit corresponds to the value of his profit in the deterministic case incremented by a constant, hence the ordering of suppliers' preferences for different coalition structures corresponds to the ordering in the deterministic case.
Therefore, the stable supplier coalitions correspond to those obtained in the deterministic case.
Comparisons
We summarize the analysis above in the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the assembler faces stochastic demand of the additive form, and some of the pricing and/or ordering decisions may be postponed. Then, regardless of the mode of competition (supplier or assembler act as Stackelberg leader), whenever order quantity decision is postponed, or if assembler's price is the only decision being postponed and (a + bC)/2 > −A, stable outcomes correspond to the ones obtained in the model with deterministic demand.
The discussion of the case in which ordering quantity decision is postponed is similar to the one provided in the case with multiplicative demand, and uses the fact that E[ε] = 0. However, if the assembler's pricing decision is the only parameter determined after the true demand is observed,
we cannot obtain closed-form expressions for suppliers' profit in a general case, and we have to evaluate cases individually. We identify a sufficient condition for stability results to carry over, which requires small-to-moderate uncertainty in demand. In addition, our computational results indicate that stability results remain unchanged for instances with higher demand uncertainty levels as well.
Concluding remarks
By extending the results from N&S (2009) to a model with stochastic demand in which all decisions are made before demand realization, we show that in the model with isoelastic demand the grand coalition continues to be stable under every model of competition. However, contrary to the results with deterministic demand, the lone supplier may be worse off (compared to his payoff in the grand coalition) under the VN and SA model, and outcomes with a single lone supplier may cease to be stable. When the assembler faces linear demand, we need to impose additional conditions if we want to preserve the stability of the grand coalition for Stackelberg models. Moreover, when both sides move simultaneously (in the VN model), the stable outcomes are likely to change (the grand coalition and asymmetric two-member coalition structures replace the split into two equal-sized coalitions) if there is enough uncertainty in the size of the total market. Thus, when deciding if they want to become a part of an alliance, or what coalition to join, the suppliers should evaluate the shape of demand and the level of uncertainty in demand for the final product. Our results indicate that the grand coalition is stable in most of the cases (unless both sides act simultaneously and there is little uncertainty in demand), although individual suppliers may see immediate benefits from defections (which makes the grand coalition unstable when the players are myopic).
As an extension of the model in which all decisions are made before demand realization, we consider models with postponement that allow players to make some of their decisions after observing the actual demand, which enables them to take advantage of the demand information that they could utilize in practice. Our analysis shows that with both isoelastic and linear demand the stable outcomes correspond to those obtained in the deterministic case if the ordering quantity is determined after the uncertainty is resolved. The same is true if demand is isoelastic and the assembler's pricing decision is postponed. However, if demand is linear and the assembler determines only her price after observing actual demand, the complexity of expressions for suppliers' profits prohibits us from characterizing stable outcomes for a general case; stability of coalition structures needs to be evaluated for specific demand parameters and distributions of random components. On a positive side, when uncertainty in demand is small-to-moderate, stability results from deterministic case continue to hold; our numerical results indicate that the same might also be true for higher uncertainty levels.
